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A Review of Medical Image Watermarking Requirements for 
Teleradiology  
Abstract 
Teleradiology allows medical images to be transmitted over electronic networks for clinical 
interpretation, and for improved healthcare access, delivery and standards. Although, such remote 
transmission of the images is raising various new and complex legal and ethical issues, including 
image retention and fraud, privacy, malpractice liability, etc., considerations of the security measures 
used in teleradiology remain unchanged. Addressing this problem naturally warrants investigations on 
the security measures for their relative functional limitations and for the scope of considering them 
further. In this paper, starting with various security and privacy standards, the security requirements of 
medical images as well as expected threats in teleradiology are reviewed. This will make it possible to 
determine the limitations of the conventional measures used against the expected threats. Further, we 
thoroughly study the utilization of digital watermarking  for teleradiology. Following the key 
attributes and roles of various watermarking parameters, justification for watermarking over 
conventional security measures is made in terms of their various objectives, properties, and 
requirements. We also outline the main objectives of medical image watermarking for teleradiology, 
and provide recommendations on suitable watermarking techniques and their characterization. 
Finally, concluding remarks and directions for future research are presented. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent technological advances introduced a radical change in the modern health care sector 
including medical imaging facilities, Hospital Information System (HIS), and information 
management systems in hospitals. Changes in medical imaging facilities in radiology have acquired 
sufficient reliability and cost-effectiveness that the film-based imaging technology has been shifted to 
filmless techniques for producing digital images on various devices rather than generating hardcopies. 
With the use of these digital medical images, in addition, HIS comprising Radiology Information 
System (RIS) and Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS) [1] has facilitated offering 
various eHealth services. These eHealth services are introducing new practices for the profession as 
well as for the patients by enabling remote access, transmission, and interpretation of the medical 
images for diagnosis purposes. This has made easy the widespread use of teleradiology with the 
potential to improve healthcare access, delivery and standards, where complex and new legal and 
ethical issues are also raising. These issues include image retention and fraud, privacy, malpractice 
liability, licensing and credentialing, and contracts for PACS, RIS, and teleradiology [2]. 
In teleradiology, one of the most successful eHealth services at present, security and privacy 
protection has become a critical issue [3, 4]. In this study, we mainly focus on the teleradiology that 
essentially captures a broad range of security requirements along with other radiological information 
management issues including that of its original medical specialty, radiology. When radiology 
employs the use of imaging to both diagnose and treat disease visualized within the human body,  
teleradiology has been for a long time understood to be an eHealth service done through remote 
transmission of the radiology images and information over electronic networks, and the interpretation 
of the transmitted images for diagnosis purposes  [3]. Remote access and transmission of the images 
and other radiology information, particularly, electronic personal health information (EPHI) expose 
them to possible tampering or theft with serious ramifications, since they are sensitive and in most 
cases EPHI are identifiable. Such radiology images and information not only require protection with 
integrity and high confidentiality but also appropriate management through different healthcare 
services.  
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Providing the required security and privacy of the radiology information  requires the following: i) 
a standard set of security and privacy profile/policy for teleradiology, and ii) a set of security 
measures by which the security principles in the profile are fulfilled. Various national and 
international legislative rules and directives define the security and privacy requirements of medical 
information. These requirements are being achieved by different conventional measures, which are 
thought to be incapable to provide the required security of the electronic radiology information in the 
PACS/RIS based teleradiology [5-7].  On the other hand, recent studies show the possibility of using 
digital watermarking for improving security in teleradiology [8-16].  
Digital watermarking has various attractive properties to complement the existing security 
measures that can offer better protection for various multimedia applications [17]. However, it is 
particularly important to know the applicability of digital watermarking from every aspect of 
radiology information requirements, and the suitability of that over other (both the existing and 
developing) similar measures. Although Coatrieux et al. [7, 18] studied the applicability of digital 
watermarking in medical imaging, a further justification of the watermarking considering the security 
requirements in teleradiology is still necessary.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. General security and privacy requirements of, and 
expected threats for, the medical information from the perspective of different security and privacy 
profiles/policies are reviewed and presented in section 2. The limitations of the conventional security 
measures to handle those threats are also studied and discussed there in. Section 3 introduces briefly 
the digital watermarking and its various benefits.  Justification over other comparable measures, 
various properties, objectives, suitable types, and their requirements of watermarking for medical 
images are also given. Concluding remarks and discussion are given in section 4. 
2. Security and Privacy Requirements in Teleradiology 
2.1. Security and Privacy Standards 
Medical information security requirements are generally defined by the strict ethics and legislative 
rules of the security policy/profile, and concerned entities must adhere to them. There are many 
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widely used guidelines and standards for protecting personal health information. The basic 
international standard developed for security management of health information is the ISO27799 
(Security Management in Health Using ISO/IEC/17799) [19]. The standard itself provides guidance to 
health organizations and other holders of personal health information on how to protect such 
information via implementation of ISO17799/ISO27002. It specifically covers the security 
management needs in this sector, with respect to the particular nature of the data involved.  
Some countries have their own security and privacy policy; for example, USA's Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [20], Code of Federal Regulations number 45 (CFR 45) 
[21], and Europe's Directive 95/46/EC [22] are expressions of such a constraint. The HIPAA 
requires all the cover entities (i.e., health plans, health care clearinghouses, and healthcare 
providers) to take measures to ensure the security of medical images to protect patient’s 
privacy.  Directive 95/46/EC states the legislative rules on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the movement of such data.  In addition, the CFR 45 (part 
164: security and privacy) includes a set of standards for the protection of sensitive EPHI.  
There is no specialized standard similar to HIPAA or CFR 45 in Australia at this time, although it 
does seem likely that a similar set of standards will eventually be required in the future, if on-line and 
electronic health records are to be appropriately protected [23]. As the government regulations in 
relation to privacy grow throughout the world, it forces the security of medical images to grow also. 
However, the Australian Law Reform Commission [24] produced the Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice Report that is a comprehensive review of the Privacy Act of 1988 (Australian Law Reform 
Commission, 2008). That review incorporates privacy regulations on electronic health information 
systems. 
Besides, the Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine (DICOM) [25] was conceived in 
1983 by a joint committee formed by the American College of Radiology (ACR) and the National 
Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA). Early standards did not gain universal acceptance 
among manufacturers. In 1993, ACR-NEMA version 3.0 was released, and at this time the standard 
was renamed DICOM 3.0. This version of that standard has become universal within radiology and 
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has been adopted in other medical fields such as dentistry, pathology, and cardiology. It is now 
commonly known as simply the DICOM standard, an eighteen-part document. This standard aims to 
define a technical framework for application entities involved in the exchange of medical data to 
adhere to a set of security profiles. DICOM also warrants the inclusion of the imaging information as 
an integral part of the patient record for the Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems, and has 
incorporated digital signatures into DICOM object, which can be used to check the integrity of 
medical images.  
2.2. Medical Information Security Requirements 
The standards and their technical frameworks, strict ethics, and legislatives rules, as mentioned 
above, give rights to the patient and duties to the health professionals. Development and 
implementation of the security and privacy protection services derived from the standards depends 
upon the model or infrastructure of the teleradiology and its concerned entities. Two widely used 
models in today’s teleradiology are referred by Ruotsalainen [3] to develop their security 
requirements. The most common model used in teleradiology is based on offline messaging. The 
other model incorporates the online delivery of distributed imaging services and allows a radiological 
information system to be spread over a large distributed area. Irrespective of the communication type 
(i.e., off-line or on-line), three individual domains, namely: i) host organization/hospital’s PACS/RIS 
(domain A), ii) communication network (domain B), and ii) consultant (domain C) can be considered 
from fig. 1 that are responsible to provide with the required security in a teleradiology system. On the 
other hand, in radiology, security concerns arise only from the domain A (e.g., from acquisition of 
medical images to storing them in PACS of the same hospital). Therefore, as we mentioned in 
introduction, the security requirements of teleradiology also include the security requirements of 
radiology.   
In an off-line model the security domains are isolated and communication is made via interfaces; 
whereas, on-line teleradiology maintains communication with a remote consultant allowing access to 
the local PACS/RIS services of the legacy system [3]. However, based on the technological and 
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organisational models used in teleradiology, their various security requirements can be outlined below 
[3, 26]: 
- All concerned entities/domains (e.g., the PACS/RIS in hospital or clinic, communication 
network, and consultant/radiologist at distant place) must have the same level of security and 
protection.  
- In all domains, proper authorization process must be employed through various access and 
user controls, transmission controls, and directive controls.  
- Integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of all radiological information have to be ensured 
during teleradilogy session, consultation process, and information processing, management, 
and preservation.  
The principle of those requirements imposes three mandatory characteristics for security of medical 
information [7, 26, 27]: confidentiality, reliability, and availability.  
- Confidentiality – ensures that only the entitled users have access to the information. 
- Reliability based on the outcomes of: i) integrity – the information has not been modified by 
non-authorized people, and ii) authenticity – a proof that the information belongs to the 
correct patient and issued from the right source.  
- Availability – warrants an information system to be used in the normal scheduled conditions 
of access. 
 
Figure 1: Teleradiology model 
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On the other hand, the security concept derived from the related standards mentioned in preceding 
section, can be established through different stages. For example, as outlined by Baur et al. [26], the 
major stages can be:   i) determination of the appropriate level of security, ii) threat analysis, iii) risk 
analysis, and iv) establishment of security concept. Determination of the appropriate level of security 
may include determining security levels of all entities and objects (e.g., IT applications and 
information sets) linked with the teleradiology system. Threat analysis helps determine the expected 
threats from the involved objects (e.g., infrastructure, hardware, software, paper-ware). Risk analysis 
helps quantify the damages for all the identified threats and their occurring frequency. Establishment 
of security concept deals with either reducing the probability of occurrence of the threats, or reducing 
the damage if an adverse event is unavoidable. This includes selection of suitable measures that 
reduce the risks to a tolerant level, evaluation of the selected measures, examining the cost-effect 
relationship as well as analysing any further risk. All these comprise the security requirements of 
different domains in teleradiology.  
Besides, for computer and network security, various requirements are entitled in different 
standards such as USA’s FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards) [4], and German’s BDSG 
(Bundesdaten-schutzgesetz) [26]. The general categories of which includes: access control; audit and 
accountability; certification, accreditation, and security assessment; configuration management; 
identification and authentication; media protection; physical and environmental protection; system 
and communications protection; and system and information integrity. However, as an important 
aspect of security and risk management in the context of information security [28], we restrict our 
attention to recognizing the value of information, and defining appropriate procedures and protection 
requirements for the information.  
2.3. Expected Threats and Conventional Security Measures 
Identifying the vulnerability of the system is important to define appropriate procedures or 
security-measures, since the strength of any system is no greater than its weakest link.  For example, 
medical images may pass through various image-information processing systems over the networks, 
and thereby, the images can be threatened throughout their lifetime in many different ways. A 
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complete protection to those threats means having individual protection mechanisms for each 
component of the processing system that the images may pass through. With particular attention to the 
medical information, here we find the suitable measures that provide the required security and privacy 
services for the information and for the communication services.   
Several existing security measures are currently being used such as access control services, 
firewall, encryption, de-identification services, certification services, etc. Further, the possibilities of 
new measures such as digital watermarking, digital signature, image hashing, etc. are currently being 
studied. According to the security requirements discussed in previous section, a review of expected 
threats and their conventional security measures are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: Security Requirements of Medical Information 
Security 
Requirement  
Threats Security Measures 
Confidentiality Disclosures and re-routing of the 
information:  
i)  during transmission (e.g., 
when an ill-intentioned person 
intercepts and illicitly copies 
files and records), 
ii) in the database (resulting in 
intrusion, identity usurpation, 
or Trojan horse virus that 
keeps an open access through 
the network) 
- Encryption of the data 
- Limiting lifetime of data 
- Private communication network (e.g., 
virtual private network) 
- Access control services (against 
unauthorized person, illegal copy, identity 
usurpation, etc.) using smart card, firewall, 
etc. 
- User control services for authenticating and 
identifying the user against identity 
usurpation, etc. 
Reliability:  
a) integrity, and 
b) 
Illicit destruction, production, and/ 
modification of the contents of 
files and records 
- One-way hash function or robust hash 
function or digital signature (DS) 
- Encryption of the data 
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authentication  - File header, audit logs for recording of data 
transmission 
- Certification of communication partners 
- Access control services for writing, 
reading, and manipulation of data 
- User control services for authenticating and 
identifying the user against identity 
usurpation 
- Software accreditation and use of antivirus 
and firewall for virus and malicious 
intrusion 
- Non-repudiation services and e-signing  
Availability File management system 
disablement, destruction of a hard 
disk, or a malicious pirate who 
disrupts or alters surreptitiously 
the organization or content of the 
data.  
- Access control services for writing, 
reading, and manipulation of data 
- User control services for authenticating and 
identifying the user against identity 
usurpation 
- Private communication network  
- Software accreditation, and use of antivirus 
and firewall for virus and malicious 
intrusion 
 
2.4. Limitations of the Existing Security Measures 
Various existing security measures, as illustrated in Table 1, are being used to protect the medical 
images and information, and their communications. For example, virtual private network (VPN), 
firewall, etc. as well as encryption, cryptographic hash function or their derivatives such as digital 
signature (DS), machine authentication code (MAC), manipulation detection code (MDC), and 
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perceptual hashing, etc.  However, these conventional security measures are considered to have 
limitations specially in protecting the medical images [6, 7, 13, 18, 29-33], which are summarized in 
Table 2 and should be properly addressed for the improved security.  
Firewall and VPN:  Among various network security measures, Firewalls and VPN are common. 
Along with intrusion detection systems, antivirus systems, etc., those measures are implemented 
mainly for protecting the information through securing the communications of a system.  
A firewall is usually placed between two networks to act as a gateway, which is a combination of 
hardware and software that protects the company's network and computers from possible intrusion by 
hackers from the external network. This is a fundamental component of any perimeter defence, for 
example, keeping unwanted and unauthorized traffic from passing (in or out) and providing an 
efficient Internet access to internal users. They can sometimes monitor for and notify of intrusions and 
network problems. They are also effective at maintaining logs of all communication activities 
between two networks, which can be used to identify abnormal events. Canavan [34] described three 
principal requirements of an effective firewall: i) it must act as a door through which all traffic must 
pass (incoming and outgoing); ii) it must allow only authorized traffic to pass; and iii) it must be 
immune to penetration or compromise.  
However, a firewall by itself does not assure a secure network and it represents a single point of 
failure [34]. Firewalls as only a tool need to be configured properly and need to be monitored. 
Firewalls that are not properly configured may allow unauthorized users through. In addition, a 
denial-of-service attack that effectively shuts down the firewall shuts down the network connection to 
the outside world. Moreover, a firewall takes time more or less to examine incoming and outgoing 
traffic, which tends to degrade network performance. 
As another significant limitation, firewalls are of no use to track activities on the internal network. 
While a firewall does make it somewhat more difficult for someone from the outside to get in, the 
majority of attacks on corporate systems come from the inside, not from the outside. In addition to the 
threat from inside of an organization, firewalls can be circumvented by outsiders [34]. As a result, 
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critical systems should be configured to monitor logins, failed logins, and all network activity of the 
internal systems.   
A VPN, on the other hand, is a means of transporting traffic in a secure manner over an unsecured 
network. A VPN usually achieves this by employing some combination of encryption, authentication, 
and tunnelling. "Tunnelling" refers to the process of encapsulating or embedding one network 
protocol to be carried within the packets of a second network. There are several different 
implementations of VPN protocols such as Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP), Internet 
Protocol Security (IPSec), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure Shell (SSH) etc. Those protocols have 
different pros and cons from different technical perspective. For example, SSL supports Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) traffic only, SSL and SSH depend on client port forwarding, some protocols 
uses symmetric or weak encryption (e.g., PPTP), and IPSec supports unicast traffic only, etc. 
However, considering the general perspective of information security, further to firewalls, a VPN can 
be used to protect the information up to the point of the communication networks. 
Encryption: In cryptography, encryption is the process of transforming information (referred to as 
plaintext) using an algorithm (called cipher) to make it unreadable to anyone except those possessing 
special knowledge, usually referred to as a key [35]. The result of the process is encrypted 
information (called ciphertext). There are two types of encryption symmetric (private/secret key) 
encryption (e.g., Data Encryption Standard- DES, Rivest Cipher #4- RC4) and asymmetric (public 
key) encryption (e.g., Diffie Hellman, Digital Signature Algorithm- DSA).  
The strength of the symmetric scheme is largely dependent on the size of the key and on keeping it 
secret. Generally, the larger the key, the more secure the scheme. Further, symmetric encryption is 
relatively fast and widely understood. However, the main weakness of this type of encryption is that 
the key or algorithm has to be shared [36]. In addition, symmetric key provides no process for 
authentication or nonrepudiation. Here, nonrepudiation is the ability to prevent individuals or entities 
from denying that a message was sent or received or that file was accessed or altered, when in fact it 
was. That is why symmetric cryptosystems are not well suited for spontaneous communication over 
open and unsecured networks.  
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On the other hand, asymmetric encryption uses two keys as opposed to one key in a symmetric 
system. One of them is kept secret and called private key, while the other is made public and called 
public key. A message is encrypted with the private key and decrypted with the public key, or vice-
versa. The advantages of this type of encryption include no secret sharing, and providing a means of 
authentication and nonrepudiation with the help of digital certificates. Unlike symmetric 
cryptosystem, public key allows for secure spontaneous communication over an open network. 
Besides, it is more scalable for very large systems than symmetric cryptosystems. Yet, asymmetric 
encryption is relatively slower and computationally intensive, and requires certificate authority [36]. 
File Header:  It is a common practice of appending metadata containing owner ID, size, last 
modified time, and location of all data blocks, etc. as a header with the data block. The size of this 
header varies depending on how much header information is to be stored. The DICOM standard 
allows Image Information Object Definitions (IOD) that a DICOM file not only contains pixel data 
but also key information about the image [37]. Thus, a single DICOM file contains both a header and 
all of the image data. 
Conventionally, each DICOM medical image is associated with a patient’s private data such as 
patient’s name, age, results of examination/ diagnosis, time taken, etc. All these private information 
are recorded into a meta-data or header file, which is appended to the image. The DICOM standard 
stores the image data and the meta-data separately. Clearly, this is dangerous as the link between the 
image and the textual information is practically non-existent [38]. For example, for the images with 
plain-text file-header, the major threat is the violation of the access rights and of the daily logs by the 
intruder.  Hence, breaking of the confidentiality implies that integrity and authenticity of the data 
cannot be guaranteed anymore [7]. Further, for an encrypted header, the bit error sensitivity may 
result in loss of header and/ raise further complexity in managing the medical images. Thus, at the 
least, the patients’ private data in a DICOM image are at risk of happenings of a mismatch (i.e., 
linking of meta-data with an incorrect medical image), and of disclosure and/ loss of header or meta-
data in an image undergoing some intentional processing.  
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Cryptographic Hash Function: A cryptographic hash function  is a deterministic procedure that 
takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string, the (cryptographic) hash value, such 
that an accidental or intentional change to the data will change the hash value [31]. The data to be 
encoded is often called the message, and the hashes are sometimes called the message digest or 
simply digest. The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main properties [39]: i) it is easy (but 
not necessarily quick) to compute the hash value for any given message; ii) it is infeasible to generate 
a message that has a given hash; iii) it is infeasible to modify a message without changing the hash; 
and iv) it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash. 
Cryptographic hash functions have many information security applications, notably in DS, MACs, 
MDCs, and other forms of authentication. They can also be used as ordinary hash functions, for 
example, to index data in hash tables, for fingerprinting, to detect duplicate data or uniquely identify 
files, and as checksums to detect accidental data corruption. Indeed, in information security contexts, 
cryptographic hash values are sometimes called (digital) fingerprints, checksums, or just hash values, 
even though all these terms stand for functions with rather different properties and purposes. In 
addition, most of the existing cryptographic hash function schemes unfortunately remain vulnerable to 
incidental modifications (i.e., even a one bit change in the input will change the output hashes 
dramatically) [31]. This severely limits their practical utility in robust content authentication for 
multimedia applications.  
Perceptual Hash Function: Perceptual hash functions (or, robust perceptual hash function, or 
simply, perceptual hashing) are designated hash functions for multimedia contents. This type of hash 
function takes a large digital image as input, and with constructing a content descriptor of the input, 
outputs a fixed length binary vector known as hash value. This hash value is required to be invariant 
under changes to the image that are perceptually insignificant, whereas on perceptually distinct inputs, 
the hash values need to be approximately independent and hence different with high probability. A 
good perceptual hash function should have the following properties [40]: i) Robust: manipulations that 
do not change the perceptual information should not change the hash value; ii) Unique: perceptually 
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different inputs should have completely different hash values; and iii) Secure: it should be very hard 
to find (forge) perceptually different inputs having similar hash values. 
Similar to cryptographic hash functions, perceptual hashing is required to generate different hash 
values for different inputs. However, here the definition of difference is changed from bitwise 
difference to perceptual difference [40]. In other words, cryptographic hash functions generate a very 
different hash value even if the input is changed by a single bit, while robust perceptual hashing are 
expected to change the hash value only if the input is perceptually changed. For instance, the hash 
value of an image and its JPEG compressed version should be the same since they have no perceptual 
difference although their bit-string representation is completely different.  
Generally, perceptual hashing consists of feature extraction and randomization that introduces non-
invertibility and compression followed by quantization and binary encoding to produce a binary hash 
output.  Most randomization methods are linear and this introduces security flaws because known 
input/hash pairs can be used to recover a secret key [41]. Further, the quantization and encoding 
stages require the learning of appropriate quantization thresholds, and the quantizer training as well as 
the storage of thresholds that introduce additional security weaknesses.  
Moreover, content-based feature extraction methods, developed from a signal processing 
perspective, are known to be robust but not secure. The ultimate goal of secure media hashing 
research is to make the job of an adversary computationally infeasible; i.e., it should be nearly 
impossible for a malicious attacker to come up with ways to tamper the image content (in a reasonable 
amount of time) and defeat the authentication scheme. The technique of perceptual (or robust) hashing 
tries to mimic these neural processes using clever signal processing and database techniques. The 
former is responsible for extracting essential perceptual features (also referred to as perceptual hash 
values or hash values for short), the latter for storing and searching large amounts of pre-computed 
hash values. In a typical setup, a local client (e.g. a mobile phone) is responsible for capturing the 
content and transmitting the content (possibly only the hash values if the client is equipped with a 
feature extractor) to a central database. The central database matches the hash values of the 
unidentified content with the pre-computed hash values, retrieves the best match, and takes 
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appropriate action (e.g., sending an artist name and song title in an SMS message to the requesting 
client). 
 
 
Table 2: Limitations of Existing Security Measures/Tools 
Measures/Tools Limitations 
Firewall and 
VPN 
- only protect the information up to the point of the internal networks [7]. 
- provide a certain level of isolation between the intra-net and internet, but are 
easily bypassed by hackers [7].  
Encryption - probably an efficient tool for secure storage and transmission, but once the 
sensitive data is decrypted, the information is not protected anymore [7, 13, 
32] . 
- simply using encryption is no guarantee of confidentiality or secrecy [36]. 
- the randomness of the data for encrypted files stored on media can be used to 
distinguish the files from other stored data [36]. 
File-header - can be easily usurped by a pirate in the plaintext format.  
- if encrypted, can be very sensitive to bit errors occurring during storage and 
transmission [7, 31] 
Cryptographic 
Hash function 
and its 
derivatives (e.g., 
DS, MAC, 
MDC, etc.) 
- hash function cannot locate where the images have been tampered [30, 31, 
42].  
- the security of DS largely depends on the strength of the hash functions used 
to validate the signatures [29] . 
- it is possible to generate two datasets with different content but having the 
same Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) hash [33]. 
- cryptographic hash function is extremely bit sensitive to the input [31, 42]. 
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Perceptual 
Hashing 
- perceptual hashing usually requires searching for match, and access to a 
central database, where a large amount of pre-computed perceptual hashes are 
stored [7]. 
- most randomization methods in perceptual hashing are linear, which 
introduces security flaws as known input/hash pairs can be used to recover a 
secret key [41].  
- their quantization and encoding stages require the learning of appropriate 
quantization thresholds. 
- the quantizer training as well as the storage of thresholds introduces additional 
security weaknesses. 
Reviewing some key existing security measures as discussed above, it can be said that they are 
useful to handle the common security problems of the system. Yet, their limitations suggest that they 
are no longer sufficient to provide the required security of the medical information in teleradiology. 
Therefore, as the new security problems are arising from the advances of technology and 
developments of PACS/RIS mentioned in introduction, new measures are required to be developed 
and deployed for the improved security of medical images and EPHI. Hence, studies show that digital 
watermarking can be promising to facilitate sharing and remote handling of that information in 
teleradiology in a secure manner [16-18], though a reasonable justification of watermarking 
applicability for medical images is lacking.  
3. Digital Watermarking in Teleradiology  
Watermarking nowadays, while well established in a range of applications [43], is only just 
beginning to be explored for healthcare and medical information systems [44, 45]. Digital 
watermarking, basically, is a process that principally permits the adding of information as a 
‘watermark’ into the object, a digital media (e.g., digital image, audio, etc.) such that the watermark 
can be detected afterwards. Generally, digital watermarking consists of three major components: 
watermark generator, embedder, and detector [46] as shown in figure 2. A watermark generator 
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generates desired watermark(s) for a particular application, which are optionally dependent on some 
keys. Watermark(s) are embedded into the object by a watermark embedder, sometimes based on an 
embedding key. Whereas, a watermark detector is responsible for detecting the existence of some 
predefined watermark in the object. It is sometimes desirable to extract a message as well.  
In a target application, digital watermarking objectives can deal with mainly two issues. One is to 
address security (e.g., authentication and integrity control of the cover object, confidentiality of the 
information used in watermark, etc.) and other is to address system considerations (saving memory 
and bandwidth, avoiding detachment, etc.; e.g., annotation of useful information such as electronic 
patient records (EPR), electronic transaction records (ETR), etc.). Further, based on the processing 
domain, watermarking schemes can be broadly categorized as i) spatial domain watermarking and ii) 
transform domain watermarking. Spatial domain schemes include LSB embedding, spread spectrum 
technique, etc., and transform domain schemes are based on DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform), DFT 
(Discrete Fourier Transform), and DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform). Watermarking in spatial and 
                            
(a) 
                                 
(b) 
                                  
(c) 
Figure 2: Fundamental components of digital watermarking: (a) watermark generation, (b) 
watermark embedding, and (c) watermark detection. 
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transform domains have different advantages and disadvantages [14, 47], which are illustrated in 
Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Advantages and Disadvantages of Watermarking in Spatial and Transform Domains 
Types of processing  Advantages Disadvantages 
Spatial Domain Comparatively simple and 
faster operation 
Vulnerable to compression, 
geometric distortion, and 
filtering 
Transform Domain Compression compatible, and 
robust against many geometric 
distortions (e.g., rotation, 
scaling, translation, cropping) 
and filtering 
Comparatively higher 
computational time and 
complexity 
 
3.1. Advantages of Digital Watermarking 
Watermarking has received much attention recently for medical image applications because of its 
various attractive attributes [7, 48, 49], which are listed below: 
Security and privacy: The fundamental and most attractive property of watermarking is data 
hiding capability [50, 51]. The utmost confidentiality can be maintained by hiding the private data 
into the images. Keeping necessary medical information (e.g., EPR including demographic data, 
diagnostic results, treatment procedures etc.) hidden in medical images may provide a better security 
against malicious tampering assuming medical images would not be of people’s interest without the 
patient information [15, 52]. Even that is tampered intentionally or in an unintended manner, can be 
detected and possibly recovered by using an appropriate watermarking scheme [53, 54]. Hence, 
Coatrieux et al. [7] outlined three main objectives of watermarking in the medical image applications: 
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data hiding, integrity control, and authenticity, which can provide the required security of medical 
images. For example, data-hiding objective of watermarking allows inserting meta-data and other 
information so that the image is more useful or easier to use. Integrity control objective of 
watermarking ascertains that the image has not been modified in an unauthorized manner. Digital 
watermarking allows permanent association of image content with proofs of its reliability by 
modifying some image pixel values, independently of the image file format. It can also operate in a 
stand-alone environment and has a versatile message set. In addition, authenticity traces the origin of 
an image.  
Avoiding detachment: The data hiding property of watermarking mentioned above further 
facilitates annotation of necessary information to avoid detachment. Millions of medical images are 
being produced in radiology departments around the world, which have immense value to practicing 
medical professionals, medical researchers, and students. Researches in this field are being 
accomplished to embed patient data to medical images [50, 55, 56]. If the EPR and the images are 
separate, the chance of detachment of patient data from the image becomes higher. Misplacing a data 
will be very crucial in the case of medical image. In order to avoid this misplacing or detachment, 
watermarking offers necessary data embedding within the image itself.  
Indexing:  Another benefit stems from data hiding capability of watermarking is indexing, where 
relevant keywords or indices can be embedded into the images and used for effective archiving and 
retrieval of the images from databases [48]. 
Nonrepudiation: In teleradiology, distribution of the watermarked images between HISs may 
cause nonrepudiation problem, where both the involved parties (e.g., hospital personnel and clinician) 
may repudiate that they did not send the data. Along with other advantages, watermarking is also 
promising to support nonrepudiation in various multimedia applications [57, 58]. Hence, use of a key-
based watermarking system may facilitate nonrepudiation in teleradiology such that both parties could 
be in safer side; where key used by the hospital could be their logos or digital signatures.  
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Controlling access: Provision for using keys in watermarking schemes further provides an 
alternative to access control mechanism, where confidential meta-data can be accessed with the 
proper authoritative rights given in terms of keys [48, 59]. 
Memory and bandwidth saving: Storage space and bandwidth requirements are important decisive 
factor for small hospitals financial economy. The memory for storage can be saved to a certain extent 
in Hospital Information Systems (HIS) by embedding the EPR in the image [56, 60] . On the other 
hand, huge amount of bandwidth is required for the transmission of the image data in teleradiology. 
The additional requirement of bandwidth for the transmission of the metadata can be avoided if the 
data is hidden in the image itself. Since the EPR and the image can be integrated into one, bandwidth 
for the transmission can be reduced in telemedicine applications [48].  
3.2. Choice of Design and Evaluation Parameters 
Watermarking requirements for medical images are mainly defined in terms of security and 
privacy, fidelity, and computational properties. Hence, security and privacy requirements characterize 
a watermarking scheme to achieve data hiding, integrity control, and authenticity objectives as 
discussed in previous section. Fidelity requirements guarantee that the watermarked medical images 
are useable for diagnosis and other clinical uses. Besides, the computational properties help obtain the 
cost benefit and feasibility analysis for practical implementation. All these watermarking 
requirements, on the other hand, define various watermarking design and evaluation parameters in an 
application scenario. Design parameters help characterize the development of a watermarking scheme, 
whereas the evaluation parameters help determine the performance of a developing/existing scheme. 
Typical parameters for watermark generation and embedding include visibility, blindness, embedding 
capacity, imperceptibility/ perceptual similarity, etc. Similarly, blindness, invertibility, robustness, 
error probability, etc. are the parameters for the detection [61].  
Moreover, deploying a watermarking system in medical image applications broadly includes two 
phases namely; a development phase and a validation phase as illustrated in Fig. 3. In the 
development phase, optimum criteria for the necessary design parameters of the system are to be 
defined properly according to the medical image requirements, since all the design parameters of 
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watermarking frequently influence one another (directly or indirectly) [62]. Similarly, it is also 
necessary to carefully consider the evaluation parameters, their suitable measures, and the 
requirements of the medical images in the validation phase, in order to justify the suitability of 
existing/developing watermarking schemes for medical image application.  
The system design and evaluation parameters for image watermarking are mainly associated with 
its core components: watermark generation, embedding, and detection [61]. Various design and 
evaluation parameters play an important role in achieving a particular objective in an application 
scenario, which has been reviewed for teleradiology application and is discussed in the following.  
Visibility:  Visible watermarking are important in recognition and/ support of possessing a digital 
image, where watermarking objectives is mainly to show some necessary information such as logo, 
icon, courtesy etc. through the watermarked image. Contrariwise, invisible watermarks are used in 
digital image applications, where watermarking objectives are to addressing security issues of the 
images. Like various digital image applications [63-71], invisibility of the watermark appears to be 
the main interest in the research of medical imaging [8-10, 12, 13, 38, 72-74]. 
Robustness: Robustness is an important parameter for the watermarking detector defined in 
different ways [75]. Robustness, basically, is defined as the degree of resistance of a watermarking 
scheme to modifications of the host signal due to either common signal processing, or operations 
devised specifically in order to render the watermark undetectable [76]. This parameter categorizes 
watermarking schemes to be robust, fragile, and semi-fragile. In a robust watermarking, a watermark 
usually carries information regarding the owner in order to validate who the image belongs to (e.g., 
which person, which institute or organization, etc.). Thus, these watermarking schemes are being used 
for content authentication purposes in various digital image applications (e.g., copyright protection) 
[63, 68, 74, 77-81]. Semi-fragile and fragile watermarks are being used to carry much information 
about itself, its owner’s metadata, its distribution, etc., and are thus used for annotation (e.g., hiding 
ETR or EPR, etc.) [15, 50, 52, 55, 60, 82] and integrity control (e.g., tamper detection and recovery) 
[8, 54, 83-85]. 
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Blindness: Blindness in watermarking refers to the ability of a component function (e.g., 
watermark generation, detection) to work without any original version of input (e.g., image or 
watermark, etc.). Non-blindness in watermark generation is important while an original image 
dependent watermark is required. An original image dependent watermark is helpful in addressing 
ambiguity and forgery attacks (e.g., copy attacks) [61]. Here, if the watermark is not dependent on the 
original image, can be easily copied to another image, or forged to output an invalid watermarked 
image [86]. Besides, blindness in detection is important, where availability of the original image or 
watermark at the detector can thwart watermarking objectives. Non-blindness in detection is used 
sometimes in developing tamper recovery watermarking schemes, where the recovery of tampered 
regions is often difficult to achieve from the watermarked image itself.  
Embedding capacity: Embedding capacity is generally measured by number of embedding bits 
(NEB). High embedding capacity is a key issue in developing annotation or integrity control 
watermarking schemes [87], which are generally of fragile or semi-fragile nature to some common 
image processing. Achieving high embedding capacity often introduces more distortions to a 
watermarked image, and thereby often makes it difficult to preserve high imperceptibility. A robust 
watermarking used for content authentication purpose requires comparatively lower embedding 
capacity than that required for annotations purposes of a fragile/ semi-fragile watermark [88, 89]. 
Research shows that LSB embedding techniques offer comparatively higher embedding capacity [13, 
90].   
 
Figure 3: Interlinking of digital watermarking with medical image applications. 
23 
 
Invertibility: Invertibility of a watermarking system indicates the detection function to be the 
inverse of the embedding function. Invertible (or sometimes referred to as reversible or lossless) 
watermarking are of special interest in digital image applications where no distortions are allowed in 
the original image. Therefore, an original image is required to be restored from respective 
watermarked images by the detector. Invertibility seldom gets interest for non-blind detector since 
detection itself requires the original image, although developing a blind detector for invertible 
watermarking is more challenging, especially when a high embedding capacity is desired. Developing 
this type of watermarking received much attention in medical image applications to avoid any 
misdiagnosis from distortions in a watermarked image [8, 67, 73]. 
Perceptual similarity: Perceptual similarity determines the degree of imperceptibility between the 
original image and its watermarked version, especially in developing an invisible watermarking 
scheme [61]. Different similarity metrics are used for this parameter such as correlation quality (CQ); 
signal to noise ratio (SNR), peak SNR (PSNR), weighted PSNR (WPSNR); mean square error (MSE); 
structural similarity (SSIM), mean SSIM (MSSIM); normalized cross correlation (NCC). In medical 
image watermarking applications, perceptual similarity must be very high to avoid any risk of 
misdiagnosis. 
Security: Security requirements of watermarking include the legitimate access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or perusal of the watermarking system. Determining these security 
requirements in a target application is crucial for the system design, and that can be determined 
through comprehensive risk management (e.g., examining security policy, access control, physical 
and environmental security, operation managements, etc.) [91, 92].  
Error Probability: Error probability is another important parameter for assessing detection 
performance of a watermarking scheme. Irrespective of application scenarios, zero error probability is 
always desirable, although achieving this is practically difficult considering higher degrees of 
robustness to any distortions [17]. However, like in other digital image applications, keeping the error 
probabilities lower as much as possible is very important in a medical image application scenario in 
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order to ensure reliable detection. Some of the important and commonly used error probability metrics 
are bit error rate, false positive rate, false negative rate, etc. 
3.3. Digital Watermarking Versus Other Security Measures/Tools 
Digital watermarking has some unique advantages for teleradiology, although few existing security 
measures/tools may serve its other objectives together. For example, encryption, cryptographic hash 
function (e.g., MAC, DS, etc.), perceptual hashing, etc. Following our previous discussion on 
watermarking and other comparable security measures/tools, an extensive comparison among them 
based on various key properties and requirements of medical image applications is made and 
presented in Table 4.   
Table 4: Watermarking Versus Other Security Measures/tools 
Properties 
and 
Requirements 
Digital 
Watermarking 
Hash Function 
Encryption Perceptual Cryptographic 
Objective 
Data and copyright 
protection 
Data protection Data protection 
Secure 
Communication 
Host-signal/ 
Cover-object  
Mostly image/audio 
data 
Mostly image 
data 
Plaintext 
message* 
Plaintext 
message* 
Secret Data Watermark - - Plaintext  
Key Optional  Optional Optional Necessary 
Input 
Generally the 
watermark and the 
cover-object/ host-
signal 
Arbitrary block of 
host-signal 
Arbitrary block 
of host-signal 
Arbitrary block 
of host-signal 
Output  Watermarked data 
Hash-values/ 
message-digest 
Hash-values/ 
message-digest 
Ciphertext 
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Detection type 
Blind, semi-blind, 
non-blind 
Non-blind Non-blind Blind  
Failure  
If an invalid 
watermarked image is 
detected as valid, or 
vice versa (e.g., from 
unauthorized removal 
or embedding of 
watermark) 
If the message is 
generated from 
the hashes, or if 
another message 
or perceptual 
changes in the 
original gives the 
same hashes. 
If the message is 
generated from 
the hashes, or if 
another message 
or bit changes in 
the original gives 
the same hashes. 
If a ciphertext is 
illicitly de-
ciphered 
Impact on 
quality/ 
content of the 
image 
Yes, but can be 
acceptably reduced/ 
resolved by 
considering Non-
Region of Interest 
(RONI) or Reversible 
Watermarking [14, 93, 
94] 
No No No 
Sensitivity to 
bit error 
Low Low High High 
Robustness 
Can be designed as 
robust, semi-fragile, 
fragile  
Robust only Robust only Robust only 
Authentication
/ Integrity 
check 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes, but as long 
as data are 
encrypted 
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Tamper 
localization 
Yes (also can suggest 
for recovery to a 
certain extent [14]) 
No No No 
Annotating 
metadata (e.g., 
EPR, ETR 
etc.) 
Yes, but to a limited 
capacity  
No No No 
Confidentiality 
of Metadata 
Yes (also, for higher 
confidentiality, 
encrypted information 
can be used in 
generating watermark) 
[52, 95, 96]) 
No No Yes 
Database 
requirement 
No, it can operate in 
stand-alone 
environment [8, 30] 
Yes, for storing 
pre-computed 
perceptual hashes 
[41] 
No No 
File-format 
independent 
Yes - - - 
* Image and audio data can be used, if they are represented as plaintext message 
As table 4 illustrates, cryptographic/perceptual hashing has no impact on quality of the host-signal, 
and is suitable for legacy content; but they are either bit sensitive (for cryptographic hash functions) 
or need access to a central database to search for a match with a pre-computed hash (for perceptual 
hashing). Whereas, research suggests that a carefully designed watermarking  scheme does not alter 
medical diagnosis [97]. Although watermarking has an impact, more or less, on perceptual quality and 
difficulties with legacy content, Guo and Zhuang [98] suggested three ways to overcome the 
distortion induced in images by watermark embedding: i) defining acceptable range of distortion for 
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watermarking; ii) separating an image into protection zone and insertion zone such as ROI (region of 
interest) and RONI (region of non-interest); and iii) considering watermarking as an invertible 
manner to recover the original image at the watermark decoder site. Hence, ROI indicates the region 
significant for diagnosis and other clinical uses, and RONI indicates the complementary region of 
ROI, which has lesser or almost no significance in diagnosis. 
Defining acceptable range of distortion for watermark embedding through clinical validation is 
expensive, which is applied by Zain, et al. [97]. In contrast, separation of ROI and RONI in medical 
images is not straightforward and may require the interaction/approval of doctor/radiologist. In 
addition, making such separation is sometimes very difficult, although which is applied in several 
watermarking schemes [9, 12, 72]. Besides, developing reversible watermarking is promising for 
medical image application with taking no risk for sacrificing the diagnostic accuracy, although 
computational properties may incur additional complexity in different processing domains. 
Additionally, Coatrieux et al. [99] discussed two limitations of reversible watermarking: i) it imposes 
the watermark removal before the diagnosis, and ii) it assumes a secured environment because, once 
the watermark is removed, the image is not protected anymore like in cryptography. All these suggest 
that a combination of suitable type of watermarking schemes, where the concept of multiple 
watermarking stems from, can be developed in order to address the rising security problems of 
medical images in teleradiology [72, 100-102]. Studies also show that incorporation of asymmetric 
encryption and lossless compression can help attain additional confidentiality, non-repudiation 
property, high embedding capacity [15, 98, 103]. 
Watermarking allows using DS or perceptual hashing for appropriate applications [73, 100, 104, 
105]. Watermarking systems have room for employing encryption for the additional confidentiality of 
metadata (e.g., in generating watermark). Memon et al. [13] proposed a digital watermarking scheme, 
in which watermark is comprised of patient information, hospital logo and message authentication 
code, computed using hash function. To ensure inaccessibility of embedded data to the adversaries, 
BCH encryption of watermark is performed there. For the same purpose, Li-Qun et al. introduced 
digital signature arithmetic (DSA) [106] and digital signature technology based on RSA public 
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cryptosystem [105], integrating reversible digital watermarking with digital signature to form an 
authentication system. 
Further, few of recent studies show the use of a compression technique for attaining the embedding 
capacity requirements of watermarking. Nambakhsh et al. [107] presented a watermarking method on 
several CT and MRI images, where the original image is compressed using the zero-tree wavelet 
(EZW) algorithm. Raul et al. [96] used Huffman compression and RC4 method that respectively 
compress and encrypt the metadata in a blind watermarking scheme.  Kundu et al. [15] presented a 
watermarking scheme that combines lossless data compression and Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) for encryption of medical images. In addition, Sung-Jin et al. [47] proposed an algorithm that 
utilizes both JPEG 2000 and robust watermarking for protection and compression of the medical 
image. Thus, depending on the application, a choice for the appropriate mixture of various 
technologies can be made to devise a suitable watermarking system for teleradiology. 
3.4. Objectives and Applications of Watermarking for Medical Images 
Popularity of internet has become a boon to patients and low capital hospitals to utilize the facility 
to communicate with the clinicians for clinical diagnosis purposes [49], where the security of medical 
images can presumably be addressed to a considerable extent by inserting a properly selected 
additional data into medical images through digital watermarking. A digital medical image application 
is therefore one of the prospective target areas of using digital watermarking. Studies show that 
various watermarking schemes can be used in teleradiology for i) origin authentication [9, 13, 38, 102, 
108-114], ii) EPR annotation [52, 60, 82, 115-117], and iii) tamper detection and recovery of medical 
images [8, 14, 54, 118, 119]. Some important aspects of medical image watermarking schemes for 
their different objectives are summarized below. 
Origin authentication: Watermarking has received much interest in the research for origin 
authentication of the medical images. The important details can be stored in images imperceptibly, 
causing no harm to the ROI of the images. This kind of brief descriptions can be hidden in images 
immediately after the production of the images in the radiology departments. This can be done by 
incorporating the watermarking in the different modality machines namely, CT or MRI scanners. The 
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database systems use the mechanisms of granting and revoking privileges and of authorization control 
to ensure the security of data with the permanent association of the watermark. Our observation 
suggests the following requirements for this type of watermarking in teleradiology: i) the watermark 
should be invisible, blind, and robust; ii) watermark should incorporate the minimum information 
required for the origin authentication; iii) embedding process must consider the RONI; and iv) proper 
validation of a watermarking scheme such that the permanent association of the watermark is reliable 
and safe for diagnosis.  
Regarding the validation of a watermarking scheme, although it is required for any scheme to be 
applied in any application scenario, extra care needs to be taken when the effect of watermark 
embedding is not recoverable. Hence, the permanent association of such robust watermarking requires 
compromising few bits, which further warrants determining the acceptable range of distortion. 
Moreover, this type of watermarking should incorporate the RONI embedding for the reliable clinical 
uses of medical images, particularly, when used along with a reversible watermarking (to form 
multiple/sequential/hierarchical watermarking scheme) that assumes a secure environment as 
mentioned in previous section.  
EPR annotation: EPR and/ other useful medical information annotation is another key objectives 
for medical image watermarking. Navas et al. [120] suggested three key requirements for EPR data 
hiding and transmission: i) the recovery of  the EPR should be blind due to the unavailability of the 
original image; ii) zero bit error rate (BER) is essential for EPR data; and iii) imperceptibility should 
not be compromised for any reason. These requirements suggest necessary criteria of a watermarking 
scheme for medical images to be invisible, blind and reversible. Such a watermarking scheme can be 
either robust or semi-fragile. For higher capacity, the watermarking scheme can be semi-fragile, 
although it requires defining appropriately the set of necessary operations/processing, to which the 
scheme needs to be robust or not to be. A bit-error correction technique can be used for attaining zero 
BER and improving watermarking performance [121, 122]. For additional confidentiality, encryption 
of the EPR can also be used in watermark generation [122, 123]. 
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Tamper detection and recovery (integrity control): Medical images in different radiological 
modalities such as x-rays, ultrasounds and MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) contain vital medical 
information and can be tampered with existing image processing tools that are easily available. Thus, 
their protection and authentication seems of great importance, and this need will rise along with the 
future standardization of exchange of data between hospitals, or between patients and doctors [113]. 
Integrity of a medical image can be achieved in three levels [124]: i) tamper detection, ii) tamper 
localization, and iii) possible recovery by approximating the tampered region. In order to achieve this 
along with the requirements of medical image needs a watermark to be i) fragile and blind, and ii) 
reversible or RONI embedding based. Hence, fragile watermarking help locate the tampered region 
with its fundamental property that a watermark becomes invalid for any malicious or un-intentional 
modifications in the watermarked image.  
If the origin authentication of a medical image is achieved by the robust watermarking, fragile 
reversible watermarking (in the form of multiple watermarking) can further locate and possibly 
recover any tampered region of the watermarked image. This will allow the system to control the 
integrity as well as authentication. In that case, if the watermarking is RONI based instead of 
reversible, then the limit of additional distortion must be taken care of. Further, as in EPR annotative 
watermarking, LSB embedding based watermarking schemes for tamper detection and recovery 
received much interest in the research, since consideration on the embedding capacity is equally 
important for the both watermarking objectives.  
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
Study of security and privacy problems is a continuous process and is mainly influenced by the 
technological advances in the field. It has been more than a decade since the study of digital 
watermarking (finding relevance and suitability, and developing of new schemes and their evaluation) 
has found its way to medical image applications. However, watermarking for medical images is not 
practically well accepted yet. This reluctance is basically instigated from the incomplete justification 
of watermarking applicability for the strict requirements of medical images. In this paper, an 
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extensive investigation is conducted and described in three parts, namely: i) the security and privacy 
requirements; ii) conventional security measures and their limitations; and iii) justification of using 
watermarking for medical images, in teleradiology.  
There is now an increasing demand for sharing medical images and process integration among 
healthcare institutions. Web services technology has recently been widely proposed and gradually 
adopted as a platform for supporting systems’ integration. The DICOM standard as well as ISO27799 
and other government regulations such as HIPAA, CFR 45, Directive 95/46/EC, etc., impose rules as 
national/international standards to protect individuals' health information, highlighting security and 
privacy protection requirements. Our study suggested three mandatory characteristics: confidentiality, 
reliability, and availability that need to be achieved for medical images in teleradiology.  
However, there are so far no holistic solutions for various security problems in this area. Although 
conventional security measures have their limitations, they cannot be replaced with any individual 
measure. For example, authentication based on watermarking cannot replace classical cryptographic 
authentication protocols that protect communication channels [125]. However, well-known 
cryptographic algorithms can be used to guarantee the privacy, authenticity, and integrity of messages 
embedded in multimedia content, where there is no cryptographic solution for the threat of 
unauthorized watermark removal [126]. To this, other conventional security measures may still be 
required, while watermarking complements the security of multimedia data. Especially, watermarking 
provides a great prospect for teleradiology because it functions as a communication tool with the 
authenticity of the origin/sender, nonrepudiation, detection of data tampering, memory and bandwidth 
saving, integrity of the image, and so on.  
We observed that the general requirement for any medical image watermarking implies that 
watermarking needs to be invisible and blind; whereas, robustness, reversibility, and RONI embedding 
as well as other design parameters must be taken into consideration according to the objectives 
dictated by the application scenario. Although it is not identified as a general requirement, a prior 
clinical validation of a watermarking scheme may always be subjected to its medical image 
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application irrespective of the type and properties of watermark(s).  As a result, any permanent or 
temporary modification due to watermark embedding may remain reliable and safe for diagnosis. 
In teleradiology, the primary objective of a watermarking scheme for medical images should be 
origin authentication. EPR annotation and content authentication (or, tamper detection and recovery) 
can be a further goal(s) to form a multiple watermarking scheme. Thereby, a properly designed 
multiple watermarking scheme may have the potential intelligence to address the rising problem in 
teleradiology.  Although the concept of multiple watermarking scheme is not new, their applicability 
in teleradiology naturally requires more explicit consideration on the performance evaluations and 
security analysis, including overall computational complexity, speed, and cost-benefit analysis. 
Finally, without considering and characterizing the required design and evaluation parameters 
systematically may pose serious flaws and may render a watermarking scheme ultimately useless for 
the application. Therefore, this study recommends a systematic development of multiple 
watermarking schemes and their complete assessment through defining the parameters properly such 
that they can offer a better complementary solution for achieving improved security in teleradiology. 
Hence, a suitable generic watermarking model and a point of reference for benchmarking is 
recommended as another milestone to be addressed in future research.  
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